The Democrats now control the White House, Senate (50 Senators and the Vice President providing a tie breaking vote) and the House of Representatives.
Senator Elizabeth Warren is proposing changes to the Bankruptcy Code.
Some of the more interesting provisions are below
Combining Chapter 7 straight bankruptcy and Chapter 13 debt adjustment for most individuals, into a new single Bankruptcy Chapter
2. Providing a discharge for many types of student loan debt – up to $50,000 in student loan debt
3. Allowing debtors to pay for attorney’s fees both before and after filing (which can result in more people seeking a straight bankruptcy discharge, rather than a repayment plan).
4. Eliminating credit counseling requirement, prior to filing.
5. Make a uniform system for bankruptcy exemptions, to protect property from seizure and sale in bankruptcy This becomes particularly significant becomes debtors can choose state exemptions, which vary widely by state.
6. Allowing a modification of mortgage debt, to the value of the property, with a reduction in interest rates.
7. Changing the rules as to when a debtor can seek a modification of a motor vehicle loan – to reduce the balance of the loan to the value of the property (cram down). 2005 law provides special rules limiting the ability of a debtor to cram down a motor vehicle loan to the value of the motor vehicle.
It is still to early to tell what, if any, changes will be made to the Bankruptcy Code.
If you have any bankruptcy questions, please feel free to contact
Attorney Robert M. Singer, 2572 Whitney Avenue, Hamden, CT 06518, 203-248-8278, rsingerct@yahoo.com
‘‘A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.’’ 4 Restatement (Second), Torts § 821D (1979); see also Herbert v. Smyth, 155 Conn. 78, 81, 230 A.2d 235 (1967). The law of private nuisance springs from the general principle that ‘‘[i]t is the duty of every person to make a reasonable use of his own property so as to occasion no unnecessary damage or annoyance to his neighbor.’’ Nailor v. C. W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 117 Conn. 241, 245, 167 A. 548 (1933). ‘‘The essence of a private nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of land.’’ W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 87, p. 619.
The common situation occurs where a neighbor of a property owner causes a situation in which a bad smell or loud noises affects another property owner. If someone physically enters a property, this is trespass, not a nuisance.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) there was an invasion of the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her property; (2) the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of the invasion; and (3) the invasion was either intentional and unreasonable, or unintentional and the defendant’s conduct was negligent or reckless. 4 Restatement (Second), supra, § 822.
‘[C]onsideration must be given not only to the interests of the person harmed but also [to] the interests of the actor and to the interests of the community as a whole.’’ 4 Restatement (Second), supra, § 826, comment (c); see also Walsh v. Stonington Water Pollution Control Authority, 250 Conn. 443, 456–57, 736 A.2d811 (1999). ‘‘Determining unreasonableness is essentially a weighing process, involving a comparative evaluation of conflicting interests . . . .’’ 4 Restatement(Second), supra, § 826, comment (c) ( A jury considers all relevant factors to determine if a use is reasonable or unreasonable).
“Courts have often found the existence of a nuisance on the basis of unreasonable use when what was meant is that the interference was unreasonable.” Prestey v. Cushman 259 Conn. 345 at 360 (2002)
It is possible to prove that a defendant’s use of his property, while reasonable, nonetheless constitutes a common-law private nuisance because it unreasonably interferes with the use of property by another person. That was the situation in Walsh v. Stonington Water Pollution Control Authority, 250 Conn. 443 ( a common situation can be where a use is legal, but still is unreasonably – such as farm).
If you are having problem with your neighbors, who are using their property in a way which causes loud noises or bad smells, please feel free to contact Attorney Singer.
Attorney Robert M. Singer
2572 Whitney Avenue, Hamden, CT 06518,
203-248-8278 rsingerct@yahoo.com
Serving Hamden, New Haven County and all of Connecticut
Samuel S. Stone v. Joseph A. Rosenfield et al provides an excellant overview of the basis for a mechanics lien. 141 Conn 188 (1954).
If any person shall have a claim for more than ten dollars for materials furnished or services rendered in the construction, raising, removal or repairs of any building or any of its appurtenances… such building, with the land on which it stands, shall be subject to the payment of such claim.” The purpose of the statute is to give a contractor security for labor and material. The statute must be construed in such a way as to render the lien it provides for some value. New Haven Orphan Asylum v. James A. Haggerty Co., 108 Conn. 232, 238, 142 A. 847
The installation of fixtures in a building gives rise to a lien under the statute only if the fixtures become a part of the realty, that is, only if they are permanent fixtures. Stockwell v. Campbell, 39 Conn. 362, 364; see Rose v. Persse & Brooks Paper Works, 29 Conn. 256, 267; Abbadessa v. Puglisi, 101 Conn. 1, 3, 124 A. 838. (the key word is permanent).
“[I]t is essential to constitute a fixture that an article should not only be annexed to the freehold, but that it should clearly appear from an inspection of the property itself, taking into consideration the character of the annexation, the nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which that part of the building was appropriated at the time the annexation was made, and the relation of the party making it to the property in question, that a permanent accession to the freehold was intended to be made by the annexation of the article.” Capen v. Peckham, 35 Conn. 88, 94; Lesser v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 124 Conn. 59, 63, 198 A. 252. (The court looks to the intent at the time that the article is attached to the property). (There must be an intent that there be a permanent attachment to the property).
In the case of Stone v. Rosenfield, there was an issue of electrical work being performed on a building. The plaintiff did some work for running a laundry business and for lighting purposes. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the court found that this type of work did not result in any structural changes so it could obtain no lien.
If you have any questions about a mechanic’s lien in Connecticut, please feel free to contact
“Materialman’s and mechanic’s lien statutes award an interest in real property to workers who have contributed their labor, and to suppliers who have furnished material, for the improvement of real property. Since neither the labor nor the material can be reclaimed once it has become a part of the realty, this is the only method by which workmen or small businessmen who have contributed to the improvement of property may be given a remedy against a property owner who has defaulted on his promise to pay for the labor and the materials.” Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 28, 111 S.Ct. 2105, 115 L.ed.2d 1 (1991).
The most common situation is a contractor who works on a piece of property, and the landowner fails to pay. The contractor then can place a mechanic’s lien on the property, to help with collection.
One word of caution in preparing a Mechanic’s Lien Certificate. There needs to be specific language in the certificate for the Lien to be valid
Unless said liens are ‘sworn to’ by the lienor, the mechanic’s lien is invalid. Red Rooster Construction Co. v. River Associates, 224 Conn. 563, 577-78, 620 A.2d 118 (1993)]. The written oath needs to state “I, claimant, swear that the facts contained herein are true.”
If you have any questions concerning Mechanic’s Liens, please feel free to contact
There are people working throughout the Coronavirus outbreak. Unfortunately, many people are still becoming infected with the virus, and these people will need to self quarantine or be hospitalized.
The issue is whether or not a person who gets Coronavirus can obtain worker’s compensation benefits, if they are unable to work because of the virus.
Connecticut law states: CGS 31-275 (15) “Occupational disease” includes any disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such, and includes any disease due to or attributable to exposure to or contact with any radioactive material by an employee in the course of his employment. see Niedzwicki v. Pequonnock Foundry, 133 Conn. 78, 48 A.2d 369; Glodenis v. American Brass Co., 118 Conn. 29, 37, 170 A. 146. Unfortunately, the Coronavirus is not peculiar to any occupation. The virus spreads randomly among people in the community. Therefore, anyone infected with Coronavirus is not entitled to worker’s compensation benefits in the State of Connecticut, for an occupational disease.
General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (A), defines the term “injury” to encompass an “accidental injury which may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred….” See Doe v. Stamford, 241 Conn. 692 at 698 (1997). In the Doe case, “there is no dispute in this case that the claimant’s exposures to HIV and tuberculosis may be definitely located as to time or place or that they resulted from accidental contact with infected suspects.” With the Coronavirus, we can expect to see claims from medical providers, including ambulance attendants, nursing home workers, and hospital employees, who get infected with the virus at work.
If you believe that you have been infected with the Coronavirus at work, please feel free to contact
Attorney Robert M. Singer, 2572 Whitney Avenue, Hamden, CT 06518
A judgment creditor will want to file a judgment lien, to help ensure that that a judgment is satisfied.
A Judgment Lien is a non-consensual lien on a piece of property. A mortgage is a consensual lien.
In Connecticut, a Judgment Lien can attach jointly own property. A judgment lien can be foreclosed in the State of Connecticut. “The execution levy at least upon sale, operates as an involuntary conveyance by the joint tenant against whom the execution runs.” “This is turn causes a severance of his undivided interest and a consequent destruction of the joint tenancy.” See New Haven Trolley & Bus Employees Credit Union v. Hill, 145 Conn. 322 (1958)
What this means is that a creditor who has a judgment lien against a piece of property in which there are joint tenants can foreclose the lien. If there is a foreclosure sale, (or a strict foreclosure), the interest of the joint tenant is severed, and the lien holder takes over the interest of the lien holder. Basically, the lien holder then becomes a joint owner of the property, or entitled to a portion of the proceeds of a sale.
If you are a judgment lienholder or judgment debtor in Connecticut, and have any questions, please feel free to contact
Attorney Robert M. Singer, 2572 Whitney Avenue, Hamden, CT 06518
There is a bankruptcy rule to follow when a bankruptcy is filed on behalf of an incompetent person or infant.
Rule 1004.1. Petition for an Infant or Incompetent Person
If an infant or incompetent person has a representative, including a general guardian, committee, conservator, or similar fiduciary, the representative may file a voluntary petition on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may file a voluntary petition by next friend or guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person who is a debtor and is not otherwise represented or shall make any other order to protect the infant or incompetent debtor.
The general rule is that a guardian or conservator can file a voluntary petition on behalf of an infant or incompetent.
If there is no such person, a petition can be filed by a next friend. However, a typical “next friend” is a person appointed by a court to look after an incompetent person, in some legal capacity.
If there is no legal representative already appointed, the bankruptcy court has the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem or make “any other order” to protect the infant or incompetent person.
Unfortunately, care for an incompetent person may be very expensive. If a party incurs debt on behalf of an incompetent person, the incompetent person may need to have filed a voluntary petition on his or her behalf.
If you have any bankruptcy questions, please feel free to call
Attorney Robert M. Singer, 2572 Whitney Avenue, Hamden, CT 06518
There are many components in paint including a binder (resin), pigments, dyes, fillers. Paint contains solvents, such as petroleum distillates, alcohols, esters, ketones and glycols. In addition, paint can have additives such as dispursing agents, driers, plasticizers, and anti-skinning agents.
Occupational exposure to paints has been linked to lung cancer and mesothelioma and bladder cancer.
Other studies relating to painting with lymphatic and haematopoietic cancers have been inconclusive.
Unfortunately, most painters do not use protective gear, such as masks, to prevent inhalation of poisonous fumes. In addition, exposure may occur from mixing and application of paint products. Other exposure may occur from thinning and filling. Another form of exposure can be from sanding. Oftentimes, after painting, a painter has a coating of paint on his or her body, including his or her hands.
If you believe that you have been injured from exposure to a dangerous chemical, please feel free to contact
Attorney Robert M. Singer, 2572 Whitney Avenue, Hamden, CT 06518
Effective for all civil actions filed on or after July 9, 2019, the (Connecticut) Veil Piercing Act applies. Public Act 19-181
In a typical veil-piercing action, a party seeks to hold another person liable personally, for the actions of the person while he was acting on behalf of a corporation.
A common situation is as follows:
a corporate officer of Any Corp. lies about the financial condition of Any Corp. and purchases goods from B Corporation. Any Corp. sells the goods. Corporate Officer takes the profit from the sales out the Any Corp. and the Any Corp. dissolves. B Corporation seeks to collect the monies due, by suing corporate officer.
The common situation involves fraud by an officer or member of a corporation, who seeks to avoid personal liability by acting on behalf of the corporation.
Under the new Connecticut law, in order to pierce the corporate veil,
Sec. 2. (NEW) (Effective from passage and applicable to any civil action filed on or after the effective date of this section) (a) A statutory limitation on the liability of an interest holder of a domestic entity for a debt, obligation or other liability of such domestic entity, including without limitation, the limitation set forth in section 33-673 or 34-251a of the general statutes, may not be disregarded based upon a veil piercing doctrine, claim or remedy in connection with a transaction to which the entity is a party, unless a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) The interest holder exerted complete domination and control over the management, finances, policies and activities of such entity with respect to such transaction; (2) such domination and control was used by the interest holder to (A) commit fraud or other intentional wrong against the person asserting such doctrine, claim or remedy, (B) intentionally violate a statutory or common law duty to such person, or (C) commit a deceitful or other unlawful act against such person; and (3) the domination and control exerted by the interest holder and the breach of duty or other act proximately caused injury or loss to the person asserting such doctrine, claim or remedy
The new law made a piercing claim difficult for several reasons
There is a requirement that the interest holder (typically a corporate shareholder or officer) must have complete control over management, finances, policies and activities of the entity. This is likely only to occur in the case of a majority or sole shareholder, or an officer of a corporation.
the interest holder either a. commit fraud or an intentional wrong (negligence is not sufficient) (fraud normally requires clear and convincing evidence) b. intentionally violate a statutory or common law duty to such person ( maybe a fiduciary duty) or c. deceitful or other unlawful act (possible lying about a material fact) (maybe an unfair trade practice)
wrongful action caused injury or loss
Interestingly, the statute goes on to state
The failure of a domestic entity to observe formalities relating to the exercise of its powers or the management of its activities and affairs is not grounds for imposing personal liability on an interest holder of such entity for a debt, obligation or other liability of such entity based upon a veil piercing doctrine, claim or remedy.
(The prior argument was that if an entity failed to act like an entity – such as holding board meetings- the entity should be pierced. This argument is no longer valued.
Reverse Piercing no longer seems to be available as a remedy.
The statute states: No domestic entity shall be responsible for a debt, obligation or other liability of an interest holder of such entity based upon a reverse veil piercing doctrine, claim or remedy.
If you have any questions concerning corporate liability or debts, please feel free to contact:
Attorney Robert M. Singer, 2572 Whitney Avenue, Hamden, CT 06518
d. The residence has a first mortgage with a balance of $140,000.
e. The residence has a second mortgage with a balance of $50,000
The wife files for chapter 7 and receives a discharge.
The husband files a Chapter 13 bankruptcy alone and asks the court to strip off the second mortgage.
Some courts have allowed the mortgage stripping, holding that the stripping could be allowed as the second mortgage has no value for bankruptcy purposes, because the first mortgage is owed more than the value of the property. See In Re Strausbough, 426 B.R. 243 (2010).
Other bankruptcy courts have not allowed mortgage stripping. In effect, the Courts have held that both the husband and wife have an interest in the property, which is subject to a mortgage lien. One tenant cannot avoid a lien, “whether partially or wholly unsecured” on tenants by entirety property. See In Re Hunter 284 B.R. 806 (2002).
I could not find a case in Connecticut discussing the stripping of a mortgage by one party who owns property jointly with another party. (In Connecticut, most property is owned jointly with right of survivorship). However, the Strausbough case cited above did not rely on the type of ownership (i.e. tenants in the entirety) but rather the fact that the lien was unsecured under bankruptcy law, in allowing the mortgage stripping.
In Connecticut, the economy is slowing and the residential real estate market never fully recovered as in other parts of the country. Therefore, we may soon see a case of a debtor seeking the benefits of the Strausbough case.
If you have any questions about mortgage stripping in Connecticut, please feel free to contact